The two essential features of a decentralized economy taken into account are, first, that individual agents need some information about other agents in order to meet potential trading partners, which requires some communication or interaction between these agents, and second, that in general agents will face trading uncertainty. We consider trade in a homogeneous commodity. Firms decide upon their effective supplies, and may create their own markets by sending information signals communicating their willingness to sell. Meeting of potential trading partners is arranged in the form of shopping by consumers. The questions to be considered are: How do firms compete in such markets? And what are the properties of an equilibrium? We establish existence conditions for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the firms' strategies, and analyze its characteristics. The developed framework appears to lend itself well to study many typical phenomena of decentralized economies, such as the emergence of central markets, the role of middlemen, and pricemaking.
markets. In other words, a market is not a central place where a certain good is exchanged, nor is it simply the aggregate supply and demand of a good. A market is constituted by communication between individual agents. The second essential feature implied by the above assumed properties is that in general the agents will face trading uncertainty. 3 Notice that in the sketched non-Walrasian trading structure 4 individually relevant information would be complete only when each agent knows not only the current price vector, but also the complete vector of effective demands of all other agents, and where and when to meet these agents.
In section II we will make these general assumptions concrete, and discuss the specific questions to be considered. In section III we will derive an equilibrium market structure from the optimizing behavior of individual agents, showing necessary and sufficient conditions for its existence, and analyze its characteristics, while section IV will conclude.
II. The Model

Agents and Commodities
Assuming time to be divided into an infinite sequence of discrete periods indexed τ, τ ∈ {1, 2, ...},
we will consider an economy with a single homogeneous, perishable commodity. 5 A set A of N agents, each characterized by preferences, technologies and endowments, is divided into two disjoint classes:
a set B of firms and a set D of consumers, with B = m, D = N−m, B∩D = ∅, and B∪D = A. We think of N as 'large'. Given the agents' preferences, technologies and endowments, any given consumer i can be characterized by a threshold price p i . This threshold price p i corresponds to the utility U i the agent would derive from the consumption of one unit of the commodity, and is the price above which this agent would certainly not purchase a unit of the commodity (see e.g., Gale [1985] or Kormendi [1979] ). Formally p i is defined by U i (0, ω i ) = U i (1, ω i −p i ), where the first argument of the utility function concerns the commodity considered, and the second represents a 'basket' of other goods or 'income'.
We assume that the threshold price is 0 for all consumers with respect to any additional unit of the commodity. Formally: U i (1, ω i −p i ) = U i (a, ω i −p i ) ∀ a ≥ 1 ∀ i. Thus, the number n of interested consumers depends upon the price p, and the aggregate demand may be written n(p), which we assume to be objectively known by all sellers. In other words, given the characteristics of the individual agents, for each price p the set D of consumers consists of n(p) potential buyers and N−m−n(p) agents who are totally uninterested in the commodity. The m firms produce and sell the commodity. They are assumed to be identical in that they use the same technology. The cost C of producing z units of output is given by the function C(z), where z∈ . We assume C(0) ≥ 0 and dC(z)/dz > 0 ∀ z ≥ 0. 6 The production decided upon at the beginning of the period is immediately available for sale, while unsold stocks perish 3 Hahn [1980] stresses the distinction between trading uncertainty, which means being uncertain as to whether or not an agent will be able to trade what he wants at the going price, and price uncertainty; soliciting an analysis of the first. 4 See Vriend [1994] for an extensive discussion of Walrasian trading structures. 5 See appendix B for the notation used throughout this paper. 6 For reasons of expositional convenience, the notation used in this paper will usually obscure the fact that some variables, in particular z and s, are discrete. We will write, for example, dg(x, y, ..)/dx instead of g(x+1, y, ..) − g(x, y, ..) for any function g(x, y, ..).
at the end. In order for trade to take place, firms and consumers must meet, and they must agree upon the terms of trade. We assume that the price p of the commodity is given and equal for all firms and consumers, and that it is known to all agents. We assume that agents know that other agents exist, but they do not know any of the characteristics of these agents. In particular, they do not know which agent belongs to which class. As some information in this respect is an essential pre-requisite for meeting potential trading partners, we have to specify the way in which agents communicate with each other, i.e., how they create their own markets.
Communication and Trade
Each seller may send information signals to some other agents at the beginning of the period, each signal being directed to one agent. A signal contains, first, the 'name and address' of the sending agent, and second, the fact that he belongs to the class of firms B. Thus, a signal reveals the type of a given agent.
7 Agents who neither perceive nor send signals cannot find a trading partner. We assume that signaling is costly, the cost being an increasing function of the amount of signals sent. The cost K of sending s signals is given by the function K(s) = k s, where s∈ and k > 0. Thus, we assume constant marginal signaling costs, dK(s)/ds = k, while K(0) = 0. Receiving signals, on the other hand, is costless.
Agents make their decisions concerning communication and effective demand at the beginning of each period. During each period they try to buy or sell in their markets. We assume that the trading possibilities for each agent are dependent only upon the communication and demands in the given period. Thus, sellers have no reputation, and there are no customer relations. Moreover, the demand above the firm's available supply is simply foregone, and cannot be backlogged. We assume that each consumer who has received one or more signals may visit one firm ('shopping'). The order in which buyers make their visit is random. 8 When a firm is sold out, customers will return home dissatisfied;
if not, they may buy one unit.
9 7 For the moment we suppose that only the sellers may send information. In section III we will show that this is not as restrictive as it may seem. Moreover, it conforms to what we usually observe in reality. Note that the signals give no information about the size of the effective demands, and that this corresponds to what we usually observe in reality. 8 To assume that consumers may make only one visit and that the order in which they make their visit is random, is only for convenience. It does not restrict the nature of the problem of the firm; it simply changes the value of some of its parameters. It is a simplified version of the more general scenario in which consumers can make more visits during each period, also on more markets to buy various commodities, while the shopping behavior is not synchronized between the consumers. Let us assume that time flows continuously, that the visits and exchanges are discrete events of zero duration, like the arrivals in a Poisson process (see Foley [1975] or Diamond [1982] ), associate with each agent a 'random clock' that rings independently for each agent at the instances of a Poisson process, and let each consumer make a visit when his clock rings (see, e.g., Griffeath [1979] ). If the length of a period τ is finite, each consumer will be able to make only a limited number of visits in each period.
9 Thus, trade in our model is bilateral. In this sense we differ from Ioannides [1990] , who also analyzes communication by individual agents in order to make markets, and then considers multilateral trade between all agents who are directly or indirectly informationally linked.
Discussion of the Model
The model is set up in order to focus on the role of communication about the identity of agents and the resulting trading uncertainty. We believe the most convincing arguments to follow this theoretical approach, are empirical. First, communication to identify potential trading partners is important in real markets. Readers may wonder why we bother to develop this model with its explicit signaling structure, since in the real world 'a consumer simply knows where to buy something'? Well-considered, such an observation gives strong empirical support for our approach. For it asserts that transactions do not take place in Walrasian central markets, or through anonymous random matching devices, but that, instead, market interactions depend in a crucial way on local knowledge of the identity of potential trading partners. Such information has to be communicated in one way or another. Most advertising in reality seems indeed to draw the buyers' attention to the fact that someone is selling something somewhere sometime. Advertising is not always in the form of signals sent directly to individual potential buyers.
Agents may also hear from radio and tv, or from friends about the newest shops in town, buyers may use the Yellow Pages to find a seller, or they may visit shops randomly, etc. While these possibilities would require slight modifications of the signaling framework used, they would seem to fit rather well into it. The essential characteristic of all these forms of signaling is that agents make information about their own type known to some other agents. And as argued already in the opening quote by Blin, the resources spent in these forms of market-making are enormous in a modern market economy.
Second, markets with trading uncertainty are empirically relevant. There are many markets in which goods are sold at fixed prices (whether as a result of legislation, of vertically imposed restrictive practices, or of optimizing behavior of the sellers), and over the period for which prices are fixed, trading opportunities are usually uncertain. Doctors fees are regulated in many countries, the prices of books are fixed by publishers' cartels in a lot of countries, bread prices in Italy are determined centrally, newspaper usually sell for the same price at all stands, etc. Nearly any retail operation has a posted price, invariant through time, orders for stock are placed in advance of knowing what demand will be, and stock outs are commonly faced. Levis jeans are sold that way. So are Seiko watches. McDonald's rarely runs out of food, but it does happen. A more exotic market where this is true is the motion picture industry (see De Vany & Walls [1994] ). Admission price is set and does not vary over the run, films are booked at theaters before demand is known, customers cannot always get a seat at their preferred showing and must queue up or wait for another day. Also custom items, e.g., in the finished steel or medical industry, usually are produced to order, at previously posted prices. Clearly, a complete economic analysis would explain such legislation, restrictive practices, or strategies, by which the prices are fixed, as well. 10 But that is not the aim of this paper. Instead of explaining the posted prices, and applying equally to all the possible ways in which these prices may have been determined, our analysis focuses on the directly ensuing not yet fully understood theoretical issue: the short run consequences for the competitive process within the industry itself. 11 Therefore, focusing on the issue concerning the identity of traders, and the resulting trading uncertainty, the first questions to be considered are: How do firms compete in such markets? And what are the properties of an equilibrium?
III. Strategies and Equilibrium
Objectives and Strategies
We first consider the agents' objectives and strategies. A consumer's utility would increase if he could buy one unit of the commodity at a price below his threshold price p. If a consumer receives one or more signals at the beginning of the period, and if the price is indeed below his threshold price p, then he chooses among these signals a firm to visit. Since all firms have the same price, and the signals as such convey no further information about the firms' service reliability, we can think of the consumers picking a firm at random. 12 If this firm is sold out, the consumer will be left dissatisfied in this period, otherwise he will buy one unit.
Firm i's objective is to maximize its expected current profit V i , which is equal to its expected gross revenue R i minus its production cost C(z i ) minus its market-making cost K(s i ), by deciding upon its effective supply z i and signaling s i . Moreover, it has to decide to which agents it will send these signals.
We assume that the destination of each signal is chosen at random. Thus a strategy t i of firm i is a pair (z i , s i ). The costs are dependent only upon firm i's own strategy, but the revenue of its market-making and production activity, i.e., firm i's actual sales (p x i , to be specified below), are a function of the vector t of the strategies of all firms (including firm i itself). 13 Thus, firm i's objective function is: V i (t)
In this model of a decentralized economy, in which the firms act simultaneously, taking for given the actions of the other firms, we restrict our attention to the existence and characterization of a Symmetric Nash Equilibrium (SNE) in the firms' strategies; neglecting the possibility of asymmetric and multiple equilibria. The reason is that when players do not know which equilibrium will be played, and each individual agent simply selects some equilibrium, the resulting combination will in general not be an equilibrium. In order to coordinate the actions of the agents, extensive communication would be required. However, the main idea of this paper is to make the communication structure explicit. Hence, implicitly assuming that there does exist a communication structure through which the actions of the agents are coordinated in order to choose an equilibrium, would seem paradoxical and counterproductive.
Stochastic Trading Opportunities
Firm i's gross revenue is equal to its sales, p x i (t). Given the assumptions made in the previous sections about the nature of the commodity and the trading structure, it is clear that firm i cannot sell more than is demanded by its customers, q i (s), or than it has produced at the beginning of the period, z i . That is, x i (t) = min{q i (s), z i }. Therefore, we must specify the demand directed towards firm i, q i (s). Proof: See appendix A. Here we give an outline only. Firm i sends s i signals at random into the population. A given signal sent has success when it induces a consumer wanting to buy one unit to visit firm i. This depends upon the probability that the receiver of such a signal is an interested consumer and the probability that he will choose the signal from firm i among the signals he receives. The latter, clearly, also depends upon the aggregate signaling activity of the other firms. It turns out that the probability that any given signal sent by firm i will lead to a consumer visiting firm i is given by Pr ( This result can be read as follows. The potential aggregate demand in the economy, given the price p, is n. 14 The probability that a given potential consumer will not receive any signal at all, and thus will not find his way to a market, is e chosen by the other firms t −i enters firm i's decision problem only through the aggregate market-making signaling activity. 15 The resulting transaction possibilities for any given agent are stochastic. Thus agents are uncertain as to whether they will be able to trade as much as they want. There are, as we have seen, two direct causes for this trading uncertainty. First, communication is stochastic, i.e., signals are randomly distributed as agents do not know each other's characteristics. Second, given that an agent has found or established a market, either he or his potential trading partners may have already fulfilled their demand before they happen to meet, i.e., shopping is a stochastic process. Note that the trading possibilities for firm i are derived explicitly from assumptions with regard to the underlying communication and trading structure of the economy, instead of assuming directly a functional form of each agent's trading possibilities. The stochastic demand for firm i's output depends upon one of the (non-price) decision variables of the firm itself. This stochastic demand is not generated by sending an 14 To lighten notational burden somewhat, we will usually write n instead of n(p). 15 Allowing for more visits per buyer would simply give a higher value for the parameter µ.
effective demand (i.e., supply) to the market, but by creating the market itself. 16 As a result, firm i's expected gross revenue may be written as follows, where f[ µ] denotes the p.d.f. with parameter µ:
Observe that the stochastic trading mechanism has an anonymity property. That is, agents who have the same effective demand and have sent out the same number of signals can expect the same realizations. This is due to the fact that trading possibilities depend only upon current period variables, that all signals are for each firm independently distributed, each agent being equally likely to receive such signals, that the firms to visit are chosen independently by all buyers, each firm being equally likely to be chosen among the firms in the buyer's market, and that the order in which buyers make their visits is determined randomly and does not depend upon the agents themselves. We further characterize the stochastic demand directed to firm i through the following claims.
Claim 1 a:
For given S −i , µ(s i , S −i ) is a one-to-one function of s i , which satisfies: µ(0, S −i ) = 0 , Thus, a firm that does not signal does not get any demand. The expected change in the demand directed to firm i as a result of sending one additional signal is positive but less than 1, and it depends only upon the aggregate signaling activity in the economy. Notice that for given S this is equal for all firms, and that it is not important which firms send these signals, and in particular it does not matter how many of the S signals are sent by firm i itself. A firm may eventually capture the whole aggregate demand by signaling more and more, given the strategies of the other firms. However, the more the other firms signal, the less will firm i's expected demand be. Suppose all m firms send the same number of signals: Thus, if all firms send an infinite number of signals they may expect to share equally the whole aggregate demand. Note that m=1 corresponds to the case of a monopolist. The claims of this section are illustrated in figure 1.
Figure 1 expected demand
Optimization and Equilibrium
We are now in a position to consider firm i's optimization problem. As a strategy t i for firm i is a pair (z i , s i ), the first-order conditions (FOCs) for maximization of firm i's payoff are a system of two equations:
Proof: See appendix A.
In other words, the gross revenue for firm i of sending one additional signal, given the strategies of the other firms, is the price p multiplied by the probability that firm i would have had still at least one unit of the commodity available, multiplied by the probability that this additional signal will lead to a consumer visiting firm i. And the gross revenue for firm i of supplying one additional unit of the commodity, given the strategies of the other firms, is the price p multiplied by the probability that it would have sold out otherwise. It is advantageous for firm i to increase its signaling s i with one unit, as long as dR i /ds i > dK/ds i = k. Similarly, it is advantageous for firm i to increase its supply z i with one unit, as long as dR i /dz i > dC/dz i . As we consider a SNE, having derived the FOCs for maximization of firm i's payoff, we evaluate these conditions only for those cases in which each firm chooses the same 17 Remember that, in fact, the variables z and s are discrete. Hence, considering unit increments of these variables, the 'true' FOCs are: Proof: See appendix A.
Both curves are drawn in figure 2. Clearly, if a firm does not produce, it does not signal either, and vice versa. Moreover, there is a maximum level of signaling, which is related to the fact that beyond that level it is very unlikely that the receiver of an additional signal will respond to that signal. Thus, whatever the level of production the expected gains from an additional signal are below its costs.
Similarly, there is a maximum level of production, which is related to the fact that it is very improbable that a customer will ever come to buy it, whatever the level of signaling. At a point of intersection of the two curves, both FOCs for maximization of firm i's payoff are fulfilled, while each firm chooses the same strategy t.
Figure 2 first-order-plus-symmetry condition 18 Anticipating a result of the analysis, we here avoid giving a rather cumbersome analogous expression for the case in which d 2 C(z)/dz 2 < 0. Now, we turn to the second-order condition (SOC) for t to be a SNE strategy: Thus, a necessary condition concerning the production technology is that there are decreasing returns to scale, at least locally. Note that whether the SOC will actually be fulfilled depends also upon the Finally, one has to consider the payoff V i to firm i. Clearly, if the expected profit when all firms choose strategy t is negative, firm i will prefer to stay inactive, and no strictly positive SNE will exist. Proof: See claim 4 and corollary 1.
These conditions imply that n, p and dC(z)/dz 2 must be large enough, while N, m, k and dC(0)/dz must be small enough. Sufficient conditions for existence of a SNE depend in a complicated way upon the parameter values. As argued by Judd [1995] , this is a typical case in which a numerical approach can help the theorist to discern and express patterns that an analytical approach would have difficulty with.
Therefore, based on the analytical results presented above, we have done a numerical analysis in order to get more insight into the values of k, C(.), p, n(.), m and N for which the derived existence conditions for a SNE are satisfied. The details can be found in appendix A. The findings are intuitively clear, and can be summarized as follows. A SNE will exist unless the costs of making a market and/or producing for the market are too high relative to the price p for each possible extent of the market at all levels of production. This may be due not only to the level of prices (p) and costs (k and dC/dz) as such, but also to too low a number of potential buyers (n) in the economy or to too high a number of competing firms (m).
Some Characteristics of the SNE
In a SNE, the economy splits up into a number of possibly overlapping markets: each firm creates its own market of size s * , and produces z * . We will now analyze its characteristics. We first consider the effects of changes in the parameter values. Without giving all the straightforward analytical details, and observing that each firm's profitability depends upon the net gains per transaction and upon its trading opportunities, our findings can be summarized as follows. Higher net gains per transaction, i.e., a higher price and/or lower production and signaling cost parameters, will, ceteris paribus, lead to a SNE with increased supply, market-making activity and expected profits. A lower number of competing firms or a higher number of potential customers will lead to higher expected profits, but the effect on the level of signaling and production activity is ambiguous. The point is that there are two opposing effects upon the s(z) curve in figure 2. On the one hand, if the probability of success of any given signal, Pr(s), increases, then the probability of success of an additional signal increases. However, on the other hand, the probability of success of all other signals also increases, implying that the firm may expect more visitors, and the probability that the firm would have at least one unit of the commodity left, F[z−1], decreases. As a result, the probability that an additional visitor would be fruitful decreases. 19 However,
we at least know what happens when n/m approaches infinity. Each signal sent will lead to a consumer visiting its sender, and hence a situation of certainty is approached. In general, however, a decrease of trading uncertainty will lead to higher expected profits, but not necessarily to increased signaling and production activity. In an analysis of market-making, it seems obvious to consider the issue of the extent of the market. Two phenomena that are considered to be related to each other in the literature, are the division of labor and the extent of the market (see e.g., Smith [1776] ). A measure of the division of labor could be the relative number of agents in the economy producing a given commodity. In our model, this would be the number of firms, m, for given N. A measure of the extent of the market could be the number of agents in the economy that is informed about the fact that the commodity is on the market. In our model, this 19 In appendix A we present some numerical examples of SNE, illustrating these findings. 20 An additional condition is that the parameters remain such so as to allow for the Poisson approximations.
would be measured by the aggregate number of signals sent, S. The proposition implies, for example, that it cannot be excluded that the aggregate market for a commodity shrinks when the number of firms specialized in producing the commodity increases.
Proposition 4:
The extent of the market (S) is a function of the division of labor (m), but the sign of dS/dm is not determined a priori.
Proof: See appendix A, where we show that the number of signals sent by an individual firm, s, is a function of the parameter m, and that an increase in m may lead to a leftward or rightward shift of the s(z) curve in figure 2. This is caused by the two opposing effects mentioned above. On the one hand, the probability of success of an additional signal increases, but on the other hand, the probability of having at least one unit of the commodity left, F[z−1], decreases.
Up to this point we have assumed that only firms may send signals. The following proposition makes clear why consumers do not generally create buyers' markets, even when the same market-making technology is available to them. Consumers are interested in buying only a very limited number of units, in our model only 1, while firms generally want to sell many more units. Related to this is the fact that, in general, there are many more consumers, n, of a certain commodity than firms, m, selling that commodity, making it more difficult for consumers to find firms than vice versa.
Proposition 5:
To get as a result that consumers do not signal, it is sufficient to assume:
Proof: Analogous to part of the proof of claim 4. Now we consider the efficiency of the SNE. Clearly, the allocation mechanism as such is informationally inefficient. We focus upon efficiency given the trading and communication structure of the model. One of the attractive features of Walrasian models is that 'The Market' is operated efficiently. A market is efficient if all mutually advantageous trades are carried out, which implies that one will not find rationed demanders and rationed suppliers at the same time (see e.g., Benassy [1982] ). In this sense the market outcome of a SNE is inefficient. In a SNE the overall economy will not be orderly for each price, as there may be some buyers as well as some firms rationed at the same time. Proof: See appendix A. Here we give an outline. Firm i's supply is z * , while the stochastic demand directed to it is represented by f[q]. Thus, the probability that firm i is rationed is equal to the probability that it will receive less than z * buyers: Prob [(x i −z i ) > 0] = F[z * −1] > 0. Next, an interested consumer j has a unit demand and may visit only one firm. Buyers will be rationed when they do not 21 Allowing for more visits per buyer would not change the picture. Each buyer dissatisfied in his first round might be more successful in his second or third round. As a result, given the level of signaling s, the probability of rationing will be lower for both firms and buyers. 22 In this respect the model differs from some other models applying stochastic rationing (e.g., Weinrich [1984] ), where it is assumed that markets are orderly, thereby implicitly assuming some kind of 'central lottery '. receive any signal or when they visit a firm that has already sold out. In appendix A we show that both possibilities may occur with positive probabilities: Prob [(x j −z j ) < 0] > 0.
As rationing with respect to the consumers is all-or-nothing, from their point of view the probability to be rationed is a good measure of the performance of the economy. For firms, however, rationing is a quite 'natural' affair. Therefore, we now consider another measure of efficiency concerning the firms.
We compare the SNE with an equilibrium that would be in the joint interest of all firms. A Symmetric Cooperative Equilibrium (SCE) is a vector of strategies such that all firms choose the same strategy, and the sum of the payoffs of all firms is maximized. According to the following proposition, a SNE is not efficient from the firms' point of view in the sense that a better, i.e., preferred by all firms, vector of strategies exists. However, each individual firm will have an incentive to deviate from the SCE strategy t c . Moreover, as proposition 8 asserts, consumers are worse off in a SCE.
Proposition 7:
The equilibrium strategy t * of a SNE involves more communication and production, but lower expected profits, than the equilibrium strategy t c of a SCE, i.e., z * > z c and s * > s c , while V * < V c .
Proof: See appendix A. Considering the appropriate FOCs, we show that the z(s) curve in figure 2 remains the same, since the production by the other firms, z −i , does not enter firm i's payoff. But now, the revenue for firm i of sending one additional signal will be lower when all other firms also send one additional signal simultaneously. As a result, the new s(z) curve will be at the left of the s(z) curve in figure 2 , and the intersection of the s(z) and z(s) curves will occur at values z c and s c that are lower than z * and s * .
Proposition 8: Prob [cons. rationed SNE] < Prob [cons. rationed SCE]
Proof: See appendix A, where we show that this follows directly from the fact that the values for both z and s are lower in a SCE.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The two essential features of a decentralized economy taken into account in our model are, first, that individual agents need some information about other agents in order to meet potential trading partners, which requires some communication or interaction between these agents, and second, that in general agents will face trading uncertainty. A number of problems concerning decentralized trade is related to these features, and may therefore be studied within this framework very well.
For example, one could analyze the existence of central markets. Let us suppose that firms may decide to 'cooperate' physically in the market-making process. Instead of each firm selling its production in its own market, there may be one or more common, central markets or distribution points.
Suppose that the technology of market-making is still the same (the central distributors sending signals giving the address of the distributor and the message that he sells the commodity), and that there are no additional costs of running a central market. When one assumes that each firm may sell in a common market in proportion to its contribution in the market-making costs, one can, for example, consider the non-cooperative solution concept of a Nash equilibrium. Each firm chooses a market to join and decides how much to contribute to the signaling activity, taking the choices of the other firms as given. This seems to capture the essential function of a central distributor.
The functioning of middlemen may also be analyzed within the framework of our model. Middlemen are not intrinsically interested in the commodity itself, i.e., they belong to neither the firms nor the consumers. They buy from sellers, and sell to buyers. This description still allows for a number of middlemen functions (e.g., reducing real transaction costs, reducing storing costs, forming a buffer between fluctuating demand and supply, speculation, etc.), but the distinguishing characteristic of middlemen is that they make a profit by taking into account the 'matching' problem of the economy.
Thus, they create markets by sending signals to establish contact with both firms and consumers.
The model would seem to be an interesting starting-point also for the study of price-making in a decentralized economy. The resulting market structure in a SNE is imperfectly competitive, although the commodity traded is homogeneous. Each firm signals to s agents, and in so doing it creates its own market. Thus, buyers might know that a firm finds as a maximum s alternative buyers in the market, and therefore buyers have some monopsony power. Each buyer on the other hand, can trade only with those firms from which he has received a signal. Thus, each firm may know that a buyer visiting him will know of only a limited number of alternative firms to visit, and therefore they will have some monopoly power. Finally, the model of decentralized trade proposed seems useful for a study of the phenomenon of liquidity: an asset being more liquid if it may be sold more cheaply and surely (see Hahn [1988] ), or problems like effective demand failures: some agents being unwilling to demand/supply more of one commodity because of uncertainty about their trading possibilities concerning another commodity (see Grandmont [1988b] ).
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof proposition 1: Suppose that firm i has sent s i signals, and consider one of those signals only. Firm i sends this signal at random into the population. (Technically, suppose firm i has put all agents in an urn, draws just one agent to determine the destination of the signal, and replaces that agent). The probability that this signal from firm i is received by an interested consumer is n(p)/N. Each interested consumer puts all received signals in an urn and draws just one signal out of his urn. Supposing that the signal from firm i is received by an agent who has received x signals in total from various firms, the probability that he would draw firm i's signal is 1/x. Thus, one has to determine x, the number of signals received by any given agent. From the point of view of such an agent, the destination of each signal sent in the economy is the outcome of a Bernoulli trial with two possible outcomes: the signal will reach him or another agent. Thus, the number of signals received by any given agent has a binomial distribution with as parameters the total number of signals sent, and the probability of reaching this given agent. If the number of Bernoulli trials in the sequence is large and the probability of reaching the given agent is close to 0, the binomial distribution may be approximated by a Poisson distribution (see DeGroot [1986] ). A glance at the appropriate probability tables suggests that such an approximation is reasonable when the number of trials is greater than 25, while the probability of success is smaller than 0.1. We assume that the sets B and D are such that both conditions will be fulfilled. Thus, the probability that this signal from firm i is received by an agent who has got (x−1) other signals is: λ S = aggregate number of signals sent by all firms Hence, the probability that any given signal from firm i will lead to an interested consumer visiting firm i is:
This probability Pr(S) refers to one single signal sent. From the point of view of firm i, each signal it has sent is a Bernoulli trial with two possible outcomes: the receiver will or will not visit firm i. The sum of a sequence of s i of such Bernoulli trials is a random variable that has a binomial distribution with parameters s i and Pr(S). (Here we make a small error. That is, even when a buyer has received more than one signal from firm i, he will perform only one Bernoulli trial.) If the number of signals is large while the probability that the receiver will visit firm i is close to 0, the number of buyers visiting firm i may be approximated by a Poisson distribution with parameter That is, each signal sent becomes slightly less likely to be successful when an additional signal competes with it. However, as long as S is relatively large, this indirect effect is negligible from the point of view of firm i: lim dPr(S)/ds i = 0. The direct effect is the probability that any given signal sent will lead to its receiver visiting The only assumption made with respect to dC(z)/dz is that it is strictly positive. As, at this point, there is no reason to impose a particular shape of the dC(z)/dz curve, in figure A.2, we draw just one possibility, chosen for expositional convenience. We see that there is a function z(s), with z (0) 
Thus, the remaining condition to check is:
Numerical Analysis: We analyze numerically for which parameter values the FOC + s and SOC for maximization of firm i's payoff V i are fulfilled, with V i > 0, when firm i chooses a strategy t * given that all other firms choose the same strategy t * . The parameters are k, p, N, m and those concerning the functions n(.) and C(.). For matters of convenience of the presentation, in the numerical analysis we restrict the production cost function C(.) to be such that dC(z)/dz is linear through the origin, and hence d 2 C(z)/dz 2 = c , with c > 0 (see corollary 1). We normalize p=1 and fix N = 100,000. So, the parameters to consider are k, c, n and m. In figure A.3.a we consider the importance of the numbers of firms (m) and interested consumers (n), fixing k and c. It seems reasonable to assume that the marginal costs of signaling k are a relatively small fraction of the price p. For example, sending a letter will not cost much more than a stamp, and other means of signaling might be even cheaper. We fix k = 0.01 and c = 0.001. As the marginal cost of production is c z, the value of c chosen implies that a firm will never produce more than 1,000 units. We see that a SNE with strictly positive values of z and s exists approximately if n/m ≥ 8. That is, given the other parameters, on average there should be at least 8 interested consumers per firm in the population, which does not necessarily mean that firms should actually get this number of clients. We have drawn no boundary of the shaded area as there are also various combinations of m and n outside this area for which a SNE exists. In any case, the number of interested consumers in the economy should be at least 1000 as k N/p = 1000 (see proposition 2). In figure A.3 .b the role of the values of the cost parameters k and c is considered, fixing the parameters m = 100 and n = 10,000. We put m low in comparison to n in order to reflect the idea of a 'division of labor'. In figure A.3 .b we use a somewhat unconventional scale on the vertical axis for expositional reasons. Clearly, the maximum value of k to consider is .10 as p n/N = .10 (see proposition 2), while the maximum value for c is 1.0. For those values above the shaded areas for which a SNE does not exist, the FOC + s or the condition V>0 are not satisfied. The SOC does not give problems. , we see that when the relative number of firms and consumers (n/m) does not change the SNE remains the same. A comparison of row 4 with 5, where the number of firms (m) increases enormously, is also interesting. Nevertheless, in this example, each firm's market-making signaling activity does not decrease, but surprisingly increases, while its supply and expected profit fall dramatically. As the final three columns show, the economic situation changes from highly favorable for the firms to highly advantageous for the consumers. In the final six rows the parameters c and k vary. Notice that the probability of a firm being rationed is on average quite high, while the probability of negative profits is much more moderate. The term between brackets may be positive or negative depending upon z and µ, while the rest is positive. Hence the s(z) curve in figure 2 may move leftwards or rightwards, depending upon z and µ. Hence, the value of dS/dm
is not yet determined.
Proof proposition 6: The case of a firm i is already considered in the text: Prob [(x i −z i ) > 0] > 0. Here we derive the probability that an interested consumer j (i.e., z j > 0) is rationed. In a SNE, the probability for a buyer to be rationed because of lack of communication is e −λ , where λ = m s/N. 0 < e −λ < 1 for λ > 0. If, instead, an interested consumer j receives one or more signals, he randomly chooses one firm to visit. This firm's supply is z. As customers are served on a first-come first-served basis, the probability to obtain its demand, then, is the probability to be among the first z customers in this firm's 'queue', every place being equally probable. The number of visitors for a firm is given by a Poisson distribution with parameter µ: f[q]. When we approximate the number of 'rival' customers visiting this firm by the same Poisson distribution, the probability that a buyer j, having received at least one signal, will be in the position to buy one unit is: 
Proof proposition 7:
Just as in the non-cooperative case, the optimal strategy is the solution of a system of two equations. Now, however, the FOCs must be taken not only with respect to firm i's own strategy t i , but also with respect to the strategies of the other firms t −i , because a change in t i implies a simultaneous, equivalent change in t −i . Thus, a SCE is a solution to the following system of two equations: . That is, an increase in the signaling activity by each of the other firms, s −i , implies a decrease in the expected number of visitors for firm i, µ(s i , S −i ). Hence, the revenue for firm i of sending one additional signal will be lower when all other firms also send one additional signal simultaneously, than in the case where firm i had to take the strategies of the other firms as given. Thus, the dR i /ds curves will be below the dR i /ds i curves in figure A.1, and for every value of z the value of s for which this FOC is satisfied will be lower, i.e., the new s(z) curve will be at the left of the s(z) curve in figure 2. As a result, the intersection of the s(z) and z (s) 
